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Syria: From Rebellion to  
All-Out War
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The rebels are backed by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
and Turkey. The killing continues. The popula-
tion of Syria is being brutalized. It is becoming 
impoverished. It is falling apart. And it des-
perately needs help. A negotiated settlement 
does not seem to be in the cards; the opposi-
tion continues to insist on a political transition 
without Assad, and the latter is not prepared 
to relinquish power. This means that there 
is an urgent need for policy recommenda-
tions that can suggest a way of resolving this   
conflict, which has now acquired an interna-
tional dimension.
Syria: the Country, its Regime, 
and its Society
“Suriyya al-Assad.” Assad’s Syria. This terse 
slogan was adopted by the Syrian regime and 
leaves no one in doubt about who actually owns 
the country. It belongs to the Assad clan, and 
not to its 23 million inhabitants. The Assads 
have ruled Syria since a military coup in 1970, 
and their power has been based on three pil-
lars: the armed forces, the intelligence services, 
and the Ba’ath party, which is based on Arab 
nationalism, and originally had a number of   
socialist elements. The regime makes adroit 
use of the fragile religious, denominational and 
ethnic composition of the population in order 
to retain its hold on power. In contrast to the 
fairly homogeneous societies in North Africa, 
in Syria there are 18 different religious and eth-
nic groups. 70% are Sunnites, 12% are Alawis, 
12% are Christians, and 2% are Druse. In ethnic 
terms the Arabs are in the majority, followed 
by the second largest   ethnic group, the Kurds. 
There are also Armenian, Circassian, Turkmen, 
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The situation in Syria at the beginning of 2013 could hardly be worse. 
Dead, wounded, refugees, a humanitarian disaster. President Assad is 
destroying his country and waging war against his own people. Russia 
and Iran back the regime. The West wants regime change without 
  intervening militarily. The political opposition is now more united but 
overwhelmed with the situation at hand. The armed resistance,   partially 
dominated by Jihadists, is difficult to size up. s
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The reason for this was the fact that the rural 
population had been neglected in the wake 
of an economic liberalization that worked in 
favour of Damascus and Aleppo, which were 
trade-based cities. In the countryside the 
memory of decades of oppression and the   
arbitrary activities of the intelligence services 
therefore mingled with a general feeling of 
hopelessness, a deeply felt sense of social in-
justice, and hatred of the corrupt elites. The 
demonstrators called on President Assad to 
introduce meaningful socio-economic reforms 
and a more open political system.
However, instead of spearheading this popu-
lar movement, Assad decided from the very 
beginning to crush the protests with the 
help of the armed forces. This prompted peo-
ple throughout the country to express their 
solidarity with the victims, and it helped the 
revolution to spread. The strategy of fighting 
resistance wherever it reared its head and 
doing everything possible to prevent the pro-
tests from reaching the capital led to a situa-
tion in which activists started to form commit-
tees and took the work of local government 
into their own hands. In this way a grassroots 
movement emerged, and it turned Syria into 
a patchwork of protest hotspots. The regime 
was fighting back with heavy weapons and 
the shabiha (or “ghost”) militias. These mostly 
Alawi mercenaries are extremely brutal, and 
they regularly persecute, maim, and kill civil-
ians. There has been a growing need for pro-
tection, and this has made people willing to   
countenance armed resistance.
In June 2011 deserters from the regular armed 
forces who refused to shoot at their own peo-
ple founded the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Ever 
more volunteers have joined them, and they in-
clude agricultural labourers, craftsmen, teach-
ers, unemployed men, and students. However 
their requests for foreign assistance went vir-
tually unheeded. The United Nations Security 
Council was in a state of paralysis. Meanwhile, 
Western states argued that the   political oppo-
sition was far too fragmented and that armed 
resistance was far too confused to warrant 
their support. For this reason the FSA started 
to arm itself with the help of Saudi Arabia, Qa-
tar, and Turkey. Bombing runs on residential 
Aramaic, Assyrian and   Palestinian minorities. 
Most of the Alawis settle on the coast, whereas 
the Druse are found in the south, and the Kurds 
in the north-east along the border with Turkey 
and Iraq. But in general, the ethnic and religious 
groups live in close proximity to each other. The 
fact that the Sunnites are the majority, whereas 
the people in key positions of power tend to be 
Alawis, is a sensitive matter. It means that con-
flicts can easily escalate in ethnic and sectarian 
terms. The Assads are in fact Alawis, and over 
the years the regime has robbed the latter of 
their denominational identity and turned them 
into accomplices of a dictatorship. The support 
of the Sunnite business elite in Damascus and 
Aleppo was economically secured by means of 
corruption and clientelism. On the economic 
front the regime has secured the support of the 
Sunnite business elite in Damascus and Aleppo 
by means of corruption and clientelism. The 
same is true of Christian entrepreneurs.
Top political positions are filled with repre-
sentatives of all of Syria’s sects. Thus none of 
the religious communities feels excluded, even 
though the country is actually being governed 
by a small group of powerful people close to the 
president. This hallowed circle is open above 
all to members of the Assad family and loyal 
supporters of long standing. Anyone who dares 
to voice public criticism is arrested, impris-
oned and maltreated, no matter which ethnic or   
religious group the person comes from. Syria’s 
dissidents include prominent Alawis, Chris-
tians, Druse, and Kurds. Thus it cannot be said 
that the Assad regime protects the minorities. 
In fact, it uses them for its own purposes. And 
it did this so adroitly that in the ongoing con-
flict the Alawis fear that the Sunnis will wreak 
revenge upon them; the Christians are terri-
fied of the Islamists, whereas the Syrian Kurds, 
like their fellow countrymen in Iraq, have now   
set their sights on autonomy.
The Revolution: From Peaceful 
Uprising to Open War
In contrast to the uprisings in Egypt, Libya, and 
Yemen, the Syrian revolution, which began in 
March 2011, first broke out in provincial areas. s
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areas, horrendous massacres among the civil-
ian population, and the general atmosphere 
of distress and despair were the breeding 
ground for radical ideas. These acquired great-
er currency in   Syria in the course of 2012. The 
unequal struggle increasingly attracted the 
attention of internationally active jihadists. 
These experienced, well-organized and well-
networked extremists came to the assistance 
of the   Syrians wherever they were fighting a 
losing battle for freedom, democracy, and the 
downfall of the regime. Some of them come 
from other countries, but they operate primar-
ily with the help of   Syrian fighters. Although 
they are still not very numerous, they have 
notched up a number of impressive military 
victories over the regime forces. The most well-
known groups are “al-Nusra Front”, which is 
said to have close links with al-Qaeda in Iraq 
(and has already been put on the US list of 
terrorists), and “Ahrar al-Sham”, which draws 
its inspiration from the salafists. The two 
groups are not integrated into FSA command 
structures, though they take part in joint mili-
tary operations. The FSA is confronted with a   
dilemma. It badly needs the professionalism of 
Qamishli
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Source: www.polgeonow.com / LeMonde © Bertelsmann Stiftung
The Fragile Coexistence of Religions, Sects and Ethnic Groupss
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Other Countries: Regional and 
International Interests
In strategic terms, virtually all of the lines 
of conflict in the Middle East intersect some-
where in Syria. As the map on p.  5 demon-
strates, Damascus is at the centre of a com-
plex regional line-up of power and interests. 
On the international level this has even led 
to what seems like a resumption of the Cold 
War. In the UN Security Council, Russia and 
China have consistently been on the side of the   
Assad regime, whereas Western members have 
supported the opposition.
Russia wants to prevent a repetition of what 
happened in Libya, where a UN Security 
Council resolution that was motivated by the 
internationally disputed legal principal of   
“responsibility to protect” led to a regime change 
brought about by foreign military intervention. 
It fears that Syria could become yet another   
example of this scenario.
On the other hand, the US and Europe believe 
that peace and democracy will come to Syria 
only if Assad is removed from power. Apart 
from this, a regime change in Damascus could 
force Iran to pull out of the Levant and weaken 
its resolve with regard to the nuclear conflict. 
However, the West is unwilling to take military 
action without a UN mandate. Many people   
believe, and so does Israel, that Islamist groups 
will be strengthened and, if worst came to 
worst, Syria will turn into a safe haven for inter-
national terrorists. In this connection, Assad’s 
chemical weapons are also a cause for concern.
On a regional level Iran and Saudi Arabia 
(which has the backing of Qatar and Turkey) 
are competing for influence. Tehran continues 
to assist the Assad regime in military, logistic 
and financial terms, whereas Doha, Riyadh, 
and Ankara primarily support the various Sun-
nite rebel groups. This stokes Shiite-Sunnite 
tensions in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Bahrain.   
Furthermore, the Kurdish question is once 
more in the regional limelight -- something 
that is a source of anxiety in Ankara. On top of   
everything else, Syria’s neighbours are hav-
ing to cope with hundreds of thousands of   
Syrian refugees, and are being destabilized in 
the jihadists in its struggle against the regime, 
though at the same time it cannot go so far 
as to adopt their ideology. This is a fine line to 
tread, for while radical Islamic views may seem 
repugnant to the majority of Syrians, they are 
quite useful when it comes to persuading men 
to fight against a powerful and daunting enemy.
The steady increase in the number of desert-
ers and defectors – among them high-ranking 
members of the armed forces, diplomats and 
politicians – means that a dwindling group of 
people at the head of the regime are fighting 
for survival. They include President Bashar   
al-Assad, who bears political responsibility for 
what is happening; his younger brother Maher 
as the leading figure in the military command; 
his cousin Rami Makhlouf, who wields consid-
erable economic power; and the latter’s brother 
Hafiz Makhlouf, who orchestrates the intelli-
gence services. 
Even though a political solution to the conflict, 
an end to the violence, and a new beginning in 
political terms is certainly desirable, it seems 
unlikely to materialize in the immediate future.
All opposition groups – even moderate critics 
of the regime in Damascus - reject a future 
with Bashar al-Assad in power. They are will-
ing though to negotiate with representatives of 
the regime on an orderly transition of power. 
Founded in November 2012, the National Coa-
lition of the Syrian Revolution and Opposition 
Forces urge direct talks with Syria's vice-pres-
ident. Instead of making Assad's resignation 
a precondition for negotiations, this is now 
the aim of a political solution. However since   
Assad himself rules out a transfer of power 
there is almost no basis for talks. Both parties 
to the conflict – the regime and the rebels – are 
still confident that they can win the war and 
are therefore determined to fight to the end.
The National Coalition is trying to build alter-
native governance structures in order to be 
prepared for a change of government brought 
about by military action. Up to now it is the 
broadest opposition alliance; and because of 
its leadership it enjoys some credibility in the 
country. However, it lacks political experience 
and organizational skills.s
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the process. This is especially true of Lebanon 
and Jordan. The regional initiative of Cairo's new 
president Mohammed Mursi, namely to negoti-
ate a solution for Syria through talks between 
Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, is on ice. 
The core problem in all political approaches is 
the controversial role of Assad in a transition. 
The meetings in early February 2013 in Munich 
between Russia, Iran, and the National Coalition 
brought some movement into the muddled situ-
ation and could give new life to the efforts of the 
Special Envoy of the UN and the Arab League, 
Lakhdar Brahimi. 
The reluctance of the West and the Arab 
League as well as the blockade of the UN let the 
  Syrian regime so far free hand to suppress his   
opponents. The brutal force used against the 
Syrian people by the Assad regime has made 
many Syrian's feel defenseless and caused 
them to lose confidence in the international 
community's ability to protect them.
Impending Threats and Policy 
Recommendations
Whether or not the current regime is removed 
from power, Syria is going to be faced with four 
significant threats: 1) A humanitarian catastro-
phe and the ongoing destruction of the country; 
2) A society that has become brutal and milita-
rized, which may lead to acts of revenge and 
© Bertelsmann Stiftung
For and Against Assad in Global Terms
Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung
Aleppo
Damascus
SYRIA
Opponents of Regime
Supporters of Regime
Two-faced approach
to regime
Fears loss of great power status and 
the tendency towards UN-led 
interventions against authoritarian 
regimes.
Russia
Wants to retain Syria as a reliable ally 
in the Middle East and opposes 
regime change initiated by other 
countries.
Fears the growing Iranian and Shiite 
inﬂuence in the region, and internal 
unrest on the lines of the
Arab uprisings.
Saudi Arabia 
Wants to be seen as the leading 
power in the region, to weaken its 
arch-enemy, Iran, and to make sure 
that Sunnite Islam is the main 
political force in the Arab world.
Fears that the ﬁghting will reach its 
own territory, Kurdish autonomy in 
Syria, and cooperation between the 
PKK and Kurdish parties in Syria.
Turkey
Wants to increase its inﬂuence in the 
region as a model of a modern 
Islamic democracy, and for this 
reason supports moderate Islamic 
opposition groups such as the Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood.
Fears that it may get dragged into a 
war and that it will be unable to cope 
with the refugees and uncontrollable 
internal demonstrations.
Jordan
Wants to remain a reliable partner of 
the West, since it needs the latter’s 
support for its economic and 
political survival.
Fears loss of inﬂuence as a regional 
power and that it will be weakened 
in the nuclear conﬂict.
Iran
Wants to keep Assad regime as its 
representative in the Middle East and 
as a bridgehead to the shiite 
Hezbollah in Lebanon, and for this 
reason supports the regime in 
ﬁnancial, logistical and military terms.
Fears an escalation of the conﬂict 
about Iran’s nuclear programme, 
especially since it hosts the 
headquarters of the US troops in 
the Middle East.
Qatar
Wants to hone its reputation as a 
regional diplomatic mediator, as a 
partner of the West, and as a 
supporter of Sunnite parties.
North: Iraqi Kurdistan wants to 
strengthen the position of the Syrian 
Kurds and is trying to encourage 
cooperation among the Kurdish parties.
Fears instability in the Kurdish areas of 
the neighbouring states as a result of 
armed conﬂict between Syrian Kurds 
and Arab rebels or Turkey.
Iraq
Centre/South: The Maliki government 
is doing its best to keep out of the 
conﬂict, and since it has strategic 
interests in Iran it permits Iranian 
assistance to reach the Assad regime.
Fears resurgent radical Sunnite 
forces, that the ﬁghting will spread, 
and that Syria will fall apart.
Fear that radical Islamists may come 
to power, that Syria may disintegrate, 
and that the war will destabilize the 
entire region.
US/EU
Want to replace Assad with a 
pro-Western pluralist democracy and 
primarily support secular opposition 
groups in Syria.
Opposition: Wants Lebanon to escape 
from Syrian inﬂuence and wants to 
regain the political leadership.
Fears religious tensions, that the 
ﬁghting will spread, and that there will 
be a civil war.
Lebanon
Government: Hezbollah needs the 
Assad regime in order to get supplies 
from Iran, and as an ideological ally 
in the struggle against Israel.
Fears major internal and regional 
weakness.
Fears that Syria will fall apart and 
that Islamist and anti-Israeli groups 
may use it as a safe haven. Fears that 
Hezbollah will stock up on modern 
weapons out of Syria and seriously 
threaten Israel.  
Israel (observant)
Wants security on the occupied 
Golan Heights, and a stable 
situation in Damascus. Wishes to 
roll back Iranian inﬂuence in Syria 
and Lebanon.s
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many places; they enable activists, deserters, 
and volunteer combatants to cooperate. They 
are well aware of what the population needs, 
and in the course of the conflict they have 
developed a remarkable ability to cope with 
logistical problems. A functioning public sec-
tor, noticeably improved living conditions, and 
the prospect of employment opportunities in 
the postwar era will make life difficult for the 
proponents of radical Islamic ideas. And, they 
will make a decisive contribution to the pacifi-
cation of the country.
The office of the working group on economic   
recovery and development in Berlin set up 
by the "Friends of Syria" with the support of 
Germany and the United Arab Emirates should 
pursue similar goals. This multilateral project 
ought to be upgraded in political terms and 
workforce.
2. An End to the Fighting, a Central Military 
Command, and No UN Troops
The FSA should set up central command struc-
tures as quickly as possible with the help of 
the National Coalition, so that when the regime 
is finally toppled they can form the nucleus of 
a new military leadership and a new defence 
ministry. The Higher Military Council, an alli-
ance of various brigades that are prepared to 
work together with the National Coalition, will 
be able to assert its authority over the jihadist 
groups and attract the support of other rebel 
units only if it receives more money and better 
weapons. The ultimate goal must be to gradu-
ally establish political control over the armed 
resistance groups so that the end of the Assad 
regime will also signify the end of the fighting. 
On the other hand, the deployment of an   
international security assistance force after the 
regime has been overthrown will be unpopu-
lar. The international community has watched 
the violence against civilians for two years and 
has left the Syrians to topple the dictatorship 
on their own. It is thus unacceptable, from a 
  Syrian point of view, to then send UN Blue 
Helmets to help with “stabilization” and “the 
protection of minorities.” The right course of 
action would be to give Syria’s new military 
leadership the support it needs in order to   
massacres; 3) A disunited or badly organized 
opposition, the weak leadership of which rules 
out an orderly political transition and makes 
it much easier for the state to disintegrate and 
collapse; 4) The growing influence of radical 
  Islamic groups. The nature of these threats 
shows that the people of Syria need the support 
of other countries. Such assistance should be 
made available on a multilateral basis, coordi-
nated by the National Coalition, and channelled 
as quickly as possible to where it is needed 
with the help of a legitimate body inside Syria.
1. Humanitarian assistance, Reconstruction, 
Prospects for the Future
There is clearly a need for far more practical as-
sistance for the three million or so refugees (2.3 
million displaced in Syria, and 700,000 in neigh-
bouring countries). Creative and unbureaucratic 
procedures will have to be devised in order to 
reach the people inside Syria who are suffering 
and in need of help. Assistance should be sent 
primarily to the liberated parts of the country 
since many Syrians have fled to these areas; gov-
ernment services have ceased to function, and 
opposition groups find it difficult to provide the 
services that people need. Apart from this, these 
regions could demonstrate to the rest of the coun-
try that Assad will be followed by a stable and 
much better political system -- and not by chaos.
The infrastructure that the regime has   
destroyed as part of its scorched-earth strat-
egy, especially hospitals and schools, must be   
reconstructed as quickly as possible. A ma-
jor challenge will be the provision of medical,   
social and welfare services for the war wound-
ed, trauma patients, widows and orphans.
As long as there are no internationally rec-
ognized government structures in the areas 
controlled by the rebels that allow bilateral 
projects, donor countries should work together 
with NGOs that are already active in Syria and 
able to assess the situation on the ground (Doc-
tors Without Borders, Grünhelme e.V., Syrian 
aid organizations in exile, etc.).
Furthermore, the new civilian self-rule struc-
tures should receive recognition and encour-
agement. Local councils have been set up in s
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restore the state’s monopoly on violence, to dis-
arm society, to stabilize the country, and to pro-
vide security for all of its inhabitants. The EU could 
offer to help with the restructuring and realign-
ment of the police force by providing appropriate  
training courses.
3. Transitional Justice, Reconciliation,  
and Messages to the Minorities
In order to pave the way for social reconciliation 
and the peaceful coexistence of all of Syria’s   
religious groups, there is a need on the one 
hand for the speedy conviction and punishment 
of those primarily responsible for the violence 
perpetrated by the state, and on the other hand 
for an amnesty for the majority of Assad sup-
porters. In the case of members of the secu-
rity forces, it will be necessary to distinguish 
between the ringleaders and those who were 
merely fellow travellers. The earlier the opposi-
tion publicizes plans for a transitional judiciary, 
the better. A legal framework must reassure the 
minorities in general and the Alawis in partic-
ular that the purpose of the battle against the   
Assad regime is not to annihilate the Alawis or 
anyone else who happens to have different be-
liefs, and that they will have a place in the Syria 
of the future.
At this point in time such a plan could help to 
harmonize the judiciary in the liberated areas, 
convince the silent majority in Syria that the 
opposition is serious about setting up rule-of-
law structures, and encourage members of the 
regime to defect.
4. Provisional Government, Retention of 
State Structures, and Reform of the 
Institutions
The National Coalition should begin with prep-
arations for a provisional government. This is 
the only way in which it can gradually take over 
the administration in the liberated areas, estab-
lish confidence in the opposition’s institutions, 
become a credible partner for donor countries, 
and thus provide an answer to the all-impor-
tant question of what will come after Assad has 
been removed from power. Since a functioning 
bureaucracy is of crucial importance during 
the transitional phase, steps must be taken to 
prevent state structures from disintegrating. 
Millions of Syrians are on   government payrolls, 
and are dependent on public services. Only an 
opposition that has done its homework will be 
able to ensure that if and when there is a power 
vacuum the institutions will not dissolve into 
thin air, and that they will continue to oper-
ate and incorporate reforms that are socially 
acceptable. In this context, it is important to 
distinguish between the government and the 
ruling clique.
Such a provisional government could also serve 
as a stepping stone to a transitional government 
of national unity. This should consist of cred-
ible representatives of the revolution and of the   
opposition, individuals capable of promoting 
social integration, and leading representatives 
of the regime who were clearly not implicated 
in crimes or acts of violence. People should not 
be chosen because they are members of a cer-
tain religious group or sect, but on account of 
their personal integrity and their involvement 
in civil society. The establishment of a propor-
tional system based on religion and denomina-
tion like the one existing in Lebanon should be 
avoided in Syria.
Time is of the essence. The recommendations 
described above should be implemented imme-
diately and at the same time. As the conflict 
drags on, the likelihood of an orderly transition 
and a pacification of the country looks increas-
ingly remote. And there is a growing risk that 
Syria will become mired in an ongoing war that 
will destabilize the entire region. The Israeli air 
force is already launching air strikes in order to 
prevent that Hezbollah is supplied with weap-
ons out of Syrian arsenals. 
In order to speed up the change in the political 
leadership, it will be necessary to put more mil-
itary and diplomatic pressure on Assad’s im-
mediate entourage, to strengthen the National 
Coalition, and to make it clear to international 
supporters in general and to Russia in particu-
lar that a transitional solution without Assad, 
which is led by the Syrians without outside in-
terference, is in everybody’s interest. This basic 
agreement should be hammered out quickly in 
the course of face-to-face negotiations between 
Russia and the US.  s
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